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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEO DURAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 16871 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from a dismissal with prejudice 
of a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, on December 5, 
1979, the Honorable David K. Winder presiding, found that 
appellant's placement in administrative segregation in maximum 
security was not a violation of his constitutional rights and 
was consistent witn Utah State Prison procedures for the use 
of administrative segregation. The court, therefore, denied 
appellant's petition. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks af f irmance of the lower court 
order dismissing with prejudice appellant's petition .for 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 27, 1979, Frank Vaughn, an inmate at the -: 
Utah State Prison, was assaulted and stabbed by three inmates. 
After being removed to the prison hospital, inmate Vaughn 
informed Warden Morris and other prison officials that appellant 
... ~ 
Leo Duran, was one of his attackers. Appellant was then 
administratively segregated and transferred to Maximum Security, ... 
pending completion of an investigation of the stabbing and 
any consequent disciplinary proceedings. 
Appellant's custody status was initially reviewed 
on July 10, 1979 by the Unit Management Team. His custody .. 
status was subsequently reviewed; by the Unit Management 
Team on August 7 and September 11; by the Central Classification 
Committee on July 23 and August 8; and by the Classification 
Review Committee on July 27 and August 17. (Appellant's 
Chronological Notes (hereafter "C-notes ") , pp. 5-6, Appendix A). 
Prison officials completed their investigation of 
the stabbing on September 12, 1979. A Major Disciplinary 
Hearing was held on September 18, 1979, at which appellant 
was found guilty of possession of a knife and of engaging with 
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other inmates in the assault upon Frank Vaughn (R.23). 
Evidence relied upon at the hearing included inmate 
Vaughn's statement to Warden Morris as well as information 
acquired from five or six confidential informants (R.22, 
23). The disciplinary action taken was to reduce appellant's 
classification to Maximum Security as provided for in the 
prison regulations {R.32). 
Appellant's custody status was then reviewed by 
the Central Classification Committee on October 5 and by the 
Unit Management Team on October 16, November 16, December 11, 
1979, and January 8, 1980 {Appellant's C-Notes, p. 7-8, 
Appendix A). 
At the January 8, 1980, meeting, the Unit Management 
Team recommended that appellant be returned to medium 
classification. The Unit Management Team concluded that 
seven months in Maximum Security was of sufficient duration 
for appellant's involvement in the stabbing. Appellant, 
however, was maintained in Maximum Security at that time, 
because of his attempt to smuggle marijuana into the prison 
and his refusal of a direct order while in Maximum Security. 
He was subsequently returned to Medium Security on March 
17, 1980. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION, AS USED BY 
UTAH STATE PRIS.ON AUTHORITIES, COMPORTS 
WITH THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The constitutional rights that accompany a 
prisoner behind the prison walls and protect him during 
incarceration are the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment, Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment protection against the imposition of any punish-
ment without adherence to certain due process procedural 
guarantees, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
The threshold question is whether a liberty interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is at stake. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 
(1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). There 
is no constitutionally guaranteed right to any particular 
housing, or classification during incarceration. Prison 
officials may classify, or house inmates wherever and however 
they wish, absent a punishment purpose therein. Therefore, 
a change in the classification or confinement of a prison 
inmate, standing alone, is not sufficient to trigger the 
protections of the Due Process Clause. Meachum v. Fano, 
-4-
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427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 
242 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 556-557; Twyman 
v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1978); Lavine v. 
Wright, 423 F.Supp~ 357, 360 (D. Utah 1976). 
State statutes, or prison regulations, however, 
may create a liberty interest embraced within the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which is sufficient to invoke the protections of 
the Due Process Clause. Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 557. 
Such state created liberty interests are as broad as and no 
broader than the statute or regulations from which they arise. 
There are no applicable Utah statutes, other than statutes 
requiring the State Division of Corrections to promulgate 
prison regulations. Examination must be made of the Utah 
Prison regulations which were in effect at the time of the 
acts complained of. 
Appellant alleges that he was unconstitutionally 
confined in Maximum Security and administratively segregated 
from June 27, 1979, to September 10, 1979. The current 
prison regulations were passed in November, 1979, and formally 
adopted on June 30, 1980. Due process rights at the prison 
in 1979 were fixed by the then applicable prison regulations 
and not the now current regulations (Utah State Prison Manual 
of Procedures, June 30, 1980). Most regulations cited in 
appellant's brief are from the now current regulations. 
They were not in effect from June 27, 1979, to September 10, 
1979. 
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Inmates have a liberty interest where prison 
regulations give them a reasonable expectation that the 
rights and privileges they enjoy, while incarcerated, will 
not be denied them absent. the occurrence of specified events. 
Generally, rules covering the classification and transfer 
of inmates place no limitations upon the discretion of prison 
authorities. A change in classification or housing is not 
conditioned upon the occurrence of a specified event. 
Where such broad discretion exists no liberty interest is 
created in the inmates. Daigle v. Hall, 564 F.2d 884, 
885-886 (1st Cir. 1977); Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F.2d 
13, 15 (1st Cir. 1977); Wakinekona v. Olim, 459 F.Supp. 
473, 476 (D. Haw. 1978); Bills v. Henderson, 446 F.Supp. 
967, 973 (E.D. Tenn. 1978). 
The court, in Bills v. Henderson, supra at 973, 
stated that where the purpose of administrative segregation 
is to provide a place of maximum security for the protection 
of inmates placed there, or of others from those inmates 
and to promote institutional security, "[t]he action of 
prison officials in imposing administrative segregation 
need not be conditioned upon the occurrence of specified 
events." Administrative segregation is a preventive, rather 
than punitive, procedure. It focuses upon the present and 
future, rather than past, actions of the inmate. Kelly v. 
Brewer, 525 F.2d 394, 399 (8th Cir. 1975). 
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The Utah State Prison Regulations, in effect 
at the time of appellant's reclassification, specifically 
provided for the imposition of administrative segregation: 
. • . when there exists good cause 
to believe that the control, management, 
safety, and/or security of the institution, 
staff, public, or inmates is threatened by 
the continued presence of the particular 
inmate in his present housing or custody 
and that an immediate and temporary change 
in housing or custody will help to reduce 
such threat. 
(R.38) (emphasis in original). 
The Utah Prison Regulations arguably create two 
liberty interests. The first arises in the initial decision 
to ~dministratively segregate an inmate in an emergency. The 
second arises in the subsequent classification review hearings. 
To determine whether any due process protections 
are applicable to the decision to administratively segregate 
an inmate, this Court must weigh the interests of the inmate 
against the needs and objectives of the correctional 
institution. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 
In Lavine v. Wright, 423 F.Supp. 357, 364 (D. Utah 1976), 
the court said: 
The institutional interests at the time 
of an assault on an inmate to protect the safety 
of other inmates and guards and to provide 
security in the facility outweigh the limited 
intrusion on individual interests which are at 
a minimum when the individual inmate is involved 
in enqangering the security of the institution. 
-7-
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The court also recognized the broad discretion of prison 
administrators to classify and transfer inmates. Id. at 364. 
In the instant case, appellant was implicated in 
the assault and stabbing ·of inmate Frank Vaughn. Conse-
quently, he was administratively segregated and transferred 
to Maximum Security pending completion of an investigation 
of the incident. 
Prison auth©rities had "good cause" to believe 
that the safety of the inmates and security of the 
institution were threatened by the continued presence of 
appellant in the general prison population. Prison 
authorities could reasonably fear additional acts of 
violence by appellant, as well as acts directed at appellant 
in retaliation for his assault on inmate Vaughn. Violence 
of this nature threatens the safety of prision staff arid 
the overall security of the institution. The decision to 
administratively segregate appellant was reasonable and 
justified. The Court in Lavine held, however, that "[t]he 
prison administration [had] created a liberty interest 
in inmates who are subjected to administrative segregation 
by providing that they will not be confined in maximum 
security for more than thirty days without a classification 
hearing." Id. at 365. The purpose of this and subsequent 
hearings is to review the inmate's continuing custody status. 
-8-
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In Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394, 400 (8th Cir. 1975), the 
court said: 
Since there must be a valid and 
subsisting reason for holding an inmate 
in segregation . • . where an inmate 
is held in segregation for a prolonged 
or indefinite period of time due process 
requires that his situation be reviewed 
periodically in a meaningful way and by 
relevant standards to determine whether 
he should be retained in segregation or 
returned to population. 
In the instant case, appellant was administratively 
segregated and transferred to Maximum Security on June 27, 
1979. His status was initially reviewed on July 10, 1979, 
well within the fifteen day requirement (R.37). Appellant's 
custody status was subsequently reviewed on July 23, July 27, 
August 7, August 13, August 17 and September 11, 1979. 
The major disciplinary hearing, regarding appellant's 
involvement in the stabbing of inmate Vaughn, was held on 
September 18, 1979, 11.ust six days after the investigation 
was completed (p. 5-6 of Appellant's C-Notes, Appendix A). 
These classification review hearings were not 
perfunctory. At the hearings held on July 23 and August 7, 
the review committees recommended that appellant be returned 
to medium security. The reason for this was that each 
committee was unaware of appellant's involvement in the 
stabbing of inmate Vaughn. Having found nothing in 
appellant's recordwhichjustified his being continued in 
-9-
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Maximum Security, the committees recommended the change 
to Medium Security. These recommendations were denied by 
the Central Classification Committee, since it had iriforma-
tion regarding appellant'.s involvement in the stabbing 
(p. 5-6 of Appellant's C-Notes, Appendix A). Appellant 
received meaningful review hearings and was therefore 
not deprived of a state-created liberty interest without due 
process of law. 
Appellant relies on Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F.Supp. 
397 (N.D. Ca±. 1976), aff'd mem., 434 U.S. 1052 (1978), for 
the proposition that failure of prison authorities to follow 
their adopted rules and regulations results in a denial of 
due process. In that case, the court extended the due 
process protections enumerated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U.S. 539 (1974), to the decision to administratively segregate 
an inmate. Both the California regulations and the facts in 
Wright distinguish it from the instant case. The court found 
that under the California rules, " .•. the inmate has an 
interest, conferred by statewide regulation . • . in not 
being confined in maximum security segregation unless he 
is found, for clearly documented reasons, to come within 
the standard set by the rules." Id. at 403 (emphasis added). 
Such documentation had to exist at the time the decision 
to administratively segregate the inmate was made. The 
reason for this is that the California regulation, unlike 
the Utah regulation, was not designed to deal with immediate 
-·. 
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administrative segregation in an emergency situation. 
The California regulation required that a hearing be held 
and that certain procedural protections be observed before 
ordering administrative segregation. These procedures 
were not being followed by California prison officials. 
On the facts of Wright, there was no inunediate threat 
to the inmate, other inmates or to the prison facility. 
The court concluded that the minimal due process 
protections called for in Wolff could be applied in the 
California prisons without threatening prison administra-
tion or safety. 
Appellant also relies upon Tasker v. Griffith, 
238 S.E.2d 229 (W. Va. 1977), to suggest that he may only 
be administratively segregated for three days pending 
investigation in a disciplinary proceeding. The court 
in Tasker based its decision upon the fact that prison 
regulations in West Virginia expressly set a three day 
limit. No such limitation existed in the Utah regulations 
at the time appellant was administratively segregated. 
Appellant further asserts that his confinement 
in Maximum Security following the Major Disciplinary 
Hearing violated his constitutional rights (Appellant's 
Brief at 10). Appellant's custody change was not made 
contingent upon approval of the Classification Committee 
-11-
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(Appellant's Brief, exhibit B); therefore, Rule 8.2(9) (a}l., 
Utah State Prison Rules and Regulations (Appendix C}, is 
applicable. This rule requires that the classification 
assigned as a disposition of the disciplinary committee 
be reviewed within 30 days. Appellant's custody change 
was initially reviewed and approved on October 5, 1979, just 
18 days after the disciplinary hearing. 
Subsequently, appellant's custody status was 
reviewed by the Unit Management Team on October 16, November 
16, December 11, 1979, and January 8, 1980. (Appellant's 
C-Notes, p. 7-8, Appendix A). Appellant's constitutional 
rights have not been violated. 
CONCLUSION 
The procedures followed by Utah State Prison 
officials in initiating and reviewing administrative 
segregation are consistent with the due process requirements 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. These procedures 
were strictly adhered to in this case. Appellant's 
constitutional rights have not been violated. The order 
of the Third Judicial District Court, dismissing with 
prejudice appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
-12-
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should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed three copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent to Mr. Douglas E. Wahlquist, Attorney for 
Appellant, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
1L ;;(f, 
this_ 22 day of March, 1981. 
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Chss. P.ev: 
6-7-79 
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6-12-79 
Class. Comm. 
Special: 
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C-note: 
6-27-79 
.Transfer: 
7-3-79 
Transfer: 
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Class. CoI!l!:l. 
Special: 
7-23-79 
CENTRAL 
Class. Comm. : 
7-27-79 
Clr'"'.BS. 
REVIEt-7: 
.· 
GERONOLOGICAL NOTES 
Parole October 9, 1979 
scs 
PAGE FIVE 
lf.r. Dura.'1 ·;-;as heard by the A-Block Classification Com.."".ittee because 
he is c~ the idle list. His reason for being idle is that he, on tis 
own free will, termi~ated r~s er::ploynent in the 3uilding Trades 
Vocational T:-aining Program. This was done on April 3, 1979. :!:ere-
fore, it is reco:r:imended that }.~. Duran be placed on a cell restrict:.c:-_ 
status between the hours of 8 J>.J,1 and 4 PM until he obtai.'1s e::olov-::ne.i;.t. 
He was also told that if he could get a v.Ti tten verificatic:: that l:.e 
would be accepted for e:ir.ployment within the next two or three "':ieeks 
that his status y;ould be reconsidered. Mr. 0-J.ran was present. a::d in-
fo:rBed of the decision. 
\'lFH/jar 
Request for cell restriction 8-4 denied until a procedure is formulat~ 
and ap~roved. 
Duran enrolled in _ _high school knowing our policies about high sc~ool 
graduates. Checking over nis records revealed he had graduated. In 
my opinion, he enrolled to be in school with the ladies./K. Broe~ 
pb 
l!ir. Duran appeared before the Classification Com:Uttee because he has 
been on an ic!le status.· However, he has recently becooe employed wit~ 
the Project Discovery which has not been C-noted in his jacket. nor.-
ever, at this time he rill not be recommended for Medium 6 PM Lech"?. 
No change in his custody. Mr. Duran·was present and informed of the 
decision. 
VIFH/jar 
I noticeC. Du.ran 10oking into the class ::ooms. He was carrying a pape:-
Later I found out it was an iro:iate ~b:ck-out form. He acted as if b.e 
wanted to sign it. \'/hen I confronted him he did."'1.'t wa."1.t to give t:e t::-_ 
paper and then he left the area. I have told him on several occassic~, 
to stay away from the area. I Broome 
pb 
From A-247 to MAX A-6 and IDLE to.ADM SEGR 
From lM-.X A-6 to MAX C-S 
Inasmuch as disciplinary has not bee completed en Hr. Durar,, he rill 
be continued for two weeks. Nir. Dura."1. was present and notifieC. c~ :.!:~ 
decisio:i. 
VIFH/jar 
As ref erred by A Block Unit Management Team, Leo appeared before the 
Central Classification Committee for the purpose of having his 
classification status reviewed. It was the decision of the Central 
Classification Committee to allow Leo to maintain his medium 
classification status. This decision was based or. the fact that 
Leo has been at Maximum Security for approximately one month and 
sufficient time has been granted and allowed for the issuance of 
an itu:Iate violation report if such an action was called for. 
This situation is co=plicated by the fact that there is little if 
any information contained within the jacket for the Central Classificat~ 
Committee to review and act upon. 
RB:pb 
~1aX.irrum classification approved. 
lwc 
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7-27-79 
Transfer: 
7-31-79 
Transfer: 
2-7-79 
Class. Comm. 
Reg. Class: 
8-15-79 
C-NOIE: 
8-17-79 
Class. 
Revier.: 
. 9-11-79 
Unit Management 
Monthly: 
9-12-79 
C-Note: 
9-18-79 
M\JOR 
DISC.: 
CHRONOLOGICAL NOTES 
From ADM SEGR to SEGR 
cw #9 
From Mll.X C-8 to MAX F-2 
PAGE SIX 
Leo appeared before the Classification Committee and presented 
us with a Phase I application to be returned to the building. 
It was the unanimous decision of the Maximum Security Unit Manage-
ment Team that Leo be referred to Central and Exec. for Medium 
6 o'clock lockup in view of the fact that there is absolutely 
nothing in his jacket suggesting justifying or eluding to any 
rationale for him being placed in Maximum Security. 
TB/jar 
lee Duran was implicated and in"i70lved in the stcbbing of Fra."1k 
Vaughn and for this reason was classi:fied !'-E.Y.irr'.um Security. A.'1y 
decision to rerrove him from that classification should not be :rade, 
i:ending the completion of the investigation of this inplicaticn, 
which will be carpleted by Septenber 1, 1979. 
EVDV: 1.....-ic 
8-7-79 Unit Management Team Screening - Request for Medium 6:00 loc}:-
up approved. 
8-13-79 Central Classification CoIIll!littee Hearing - Approved above 
reouest. 
8:...i7-79 Classification Review - j)enied request for !~1ediu...'1l 6 :00 
lock-up until investigation on stabbing is complete. 
Refer to packet filed.herein for details. 
scs 
Leo's case was reviewed by the Unit Management Team on this date. L:: 
has been maintaining extremely well since being placed in Maximum 
Security on June 27, 1979, for alleged involvement in a stabbing. 
Leo still has not received a writeup, eventhough there is a C-note 
entry on August 15, 1979, from Mr. VanDerVeur stating that the in-
vestigation would be complete by September l, 1979, and writeups 
issued. Leo to his credit asks.for nothing. He gets involved in no 
altercations at the Maximum Security Unit and is maintaining very \·ie. 
No chanae was made in his custody due to a directive from Mr. Van Ce' 
Veur ana Mr. Hatch. 
TVS/jar 
Completed mvestigation of Leo Duran's involvement in Frc>n.~ Vaughn 
stabbing today. Write-up will be rrade 9/13/79. (See C-note 8/13/i': 
FVDV:lwc 
CDMMITI'EE: tarry Robinson, Chai.:r:man, 'i'hcxras Bona and w. R. ?-bss, 
?~. 
FINDrnGS: <;uilty of FOSSession of a knife and engaging wit."1. !bbe.l:-': 
Rorrero #13607 and Rudy Duran #14247 in the stabbing of Frank Vauc~~ 
#13692. The investigator's report na.rres five or six infonremts ~o 
witnessed the IiCVer!EI'lt of Rudy and Leo Duran, as well as Ro~ 
Rarero. Lt. Mark Roberts was present as S'!:.aff Re:;:>resentative. 
DISPOSITION: Reduction in classification to Ma.xi:rr...r:l Security; refer 
to County Attorney's office for investigation and p:>ssible prcsecut:. 
refer to Unit M.anagE:el1t Team with referral to the Board of Pardons. 
BASIS: This is a rranagerrent and control problem. 
lwc 
-ii-
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CHRONOLOGICAL NOTES 
PAGE SEVEN 
By referral from Major Disciplinary Ccmmittee, September 18, 1979, 
Leo appeared before a convened body of Central Classification October 
5, 1979. Leo was advised as to the reason for the hearing - that 
being the Major Disciolinar.v Committee's recommendation that he be 
referred to the attention of the Board of Pardons, as implied, due 
to the seriousness and oravitv of the infraction of which he had 
been determined to be guilty. 
Subsequent to lenqthy deliberation with Leo, it was the detenninatio~ 
of the Committee to refer him to the Board of Pardons. This decision 
was derived for the following reasons: 
1. Contrary tr. Leo's ins is tance, it was the judgement of the commit:·. 
that he be aiven proper due process prior to the detenination of 
guilt. 
2. In the .iudo1i1ent of the Committee, the infractions of which Leo 
was determined to have commissioned were of such a serious r:iaani~ 
as to· raise reasonable doubt as to the appropriateness and advise 
of his returning to the Com~unity at this time. 
Richard Burt/scs 
On this date a 90 day disposition was filed with SL County Attorney 
and SL Clerk of the Court on any untried Criminal charges. 
B. Tisher, Records 
From MAX H-10 to MAX H-4 
Parole date of October 9, 1979, rescinded. New parole date October 13. 
1981. 
scs 
On October 10, 1979, Leo returned to Maximum Security after appeariri~ 
before the Board of Pardons. He was quite hostile and upset over his 
parole date rescinded and given a two year date. However, he mellowe· 
out after a few hours and has been no problem in the facility since 
that time. No change was made in his custodv. 
TVB/.iar 
From MAX F-2 to MAX A9 
From MAX A-9 to MAX F-2 
Leo recently received a writeup for smuggling six ballonns into 
Maximum Security. He is on a pending status at this time. No chang: 
will be made in his custody. 
TB/jar 
Leo was removed from A Section and returned to his cell in G Section 
this date. He stated he would no longer physically resist when givan 
an order./Stoddard 
pb 
Request for Medium B classification denied. 
Request for Medium B classification denied due to behavioral proble.-ns 
in Maxim.lm Security. 
lwc 
Mr Leo Duran was reviewed at this time. It was decided by the Unit 
Ma~agement Team to recorrvnend Medium Custody to be housed on A-Block. 
WFH/jar 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11-30-79 
C-Note: 
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Unit Management 
Team: 
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·Central 
Class.: 
CHRONOLOGICAL NOTES 
PAGE EIGHT 
The following write-up was to be heard by the Major disciplinary 
committee. Due to an administrative oversight the write-up was not 
heard. Lt. Robinson, the Hearing Officer, had two deaths in his 
immediate fat:lily, consequently he was called away from the institution. 
By the ti~e the write-up was discovered the eharing date had expired. 
The write-up read as follows: 
I was standing by the visitors entrance to the maximum visiting rocm 
waiting for the visitors to enter the sallyport area. I obse'!"Ved Leo 
walk to the drinking fountain, place an object in his mouth and take 
a drink. He then placed his right hand deep into his pants pocket and 
pulled it back out in a grasping fashion. He then appeared to pop a 
balloon like object in his mouth. I said, "Leo, don't swallow tb.at." 
He rearranged the item in his mouth and walked over towards me so 
that we could converse through the sallyport screen (he was stancing 
in the sallyport). I said, "spit out what you put in your mouth 
and give it to me." He said,- "what?" I repeated the order. He 
turned around and walked out of the sallyport complaining to his 
visitors about my request. He went to the drinking fountain a..~d took 
a drink, swallowing the item it appeared, while his borther Rudy atte=~ 
to sheild his movements from my view. At 2:40 p.~. Sgt. Vaifanua and 
I went to F-Section to sahke Leo down, Leo was secured in the 
shower as we entered so Officer DAy let Leo out of the shower and 
we shook him down. We then started toward Leo's cell which was next 
to the shower as Leo was being secured in the shower. Leo slipped 
past us and into his house as I or-ered him to stop. He grabbed for 
a green balloon like object on the bed and I grabbed him. A scuffle tl: 
ensued as he attempted to place the object in his mouth and I atte:optec 
to stop him. Sgt. Viafanua entered the cell and assisted me in 
subduing Leo and relieved him of the object i~ his hand. Leo then ~e~: 
to the shower and was secured. On the bed Sgt. Viafanua a~d I found 
five more (six total) balloons, three blue, two greens and one yello~. 
The balloons were filled with a marijuana like substance and were 
attached to the write-up./Lt. Robert Stoddard 
pb 
Leo's case was reviewed by the Unit Management Team on this date. Leo 
has functioned very well since being placed in Maximum Security approx-
imately six months ago. There was one incident where he had his family 
bring in some balloons with mariju·ana in them. He refused a direct o;.: 
from the Director of Maximum Security to release those balloons and a 
scuffle pursued. Due to a technicality on timing the writeup was turr.~ 
into a C-Note. However, they were designate to the balloons as they 
were found in his possession. NQ change was made in his custody at tr.~ 
time. 
TB/jar 
Leo came to Maximum Security in June for his involvement for the stabt:~· 
of Frank Vaughn. Since being in Maximum Security he has been maintain~ 
an extremely low profile with one exception of having some balloons. ~­
basically has never been a manageiraent problem while in Maximum Securi:' 
and is functioning very well. It wa·s felt by the Unit Management Tea~, 
that seven months at Maxir:ium Security for this offense is o~ satisfac:.c' 
duration and, therefore, we a-re referring Leo to Central Classificaticn 
for Mediur.i. 
TB/jar 
Leo appeared before the Central Classification Committee for the purpos~ 
.of being considered for ~1edium Classification with a 'Mediiim B ManagemQ:1.~ 
Level Status. During the delibera~n process it was detet"t:l.ined that 
Leo was classified Maxitlum due to llnis complicity in the stabbing incide:-
which transpired on A Block at or about September 1979. According to 
Unit Management Team entry Leo's fumctioning at Maximum Security has ce.: 
acceptable. It was the decision.a! the Central Classification Co:::nittQc 
to refer Leo for Medium Classific:at.ion, Medium B management level status. 
RB:pb 
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APPENDIX B 
AMENDMENT V 
Ko person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in tqe Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprh-ed of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall priYate property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
.ArfLENDMENT VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the l""nited States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
"vherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprhe an~· person of life, liberty, or property~ without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respectiYe numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants. of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the 'vhole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. · 
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APPENDIX B 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under -any State, who, having previously taken 
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall lmve engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
senices in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
>United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any sla-ve; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall lmve power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
-vi-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX C 
.2 - Major Dispositions. At the completion of the major disciplinary committee 
earing, the committee chairman shall be responsible for completing the committee,s 
eport which shall include the findings, the evidence relied on, the basis or 
easons for the decision and the final disposition. If any omissions in 
ocumentation are necessary, the reasons for the omissions shall be stated in the 
ecord, except as provided for in 4. 1 ( f). 
• • • 
_ Major violations may be disposed of in one or any combination of the 
following ways (suspended sentences will not be imposed): 
••• 
(9) Reduction in classification to a level determined appropriate 
by the disciplinary committee. 
(a) When this option is chosen the following conditions 
shall be observed: 
1. 111e ind i vi<lual thus reduced in custody shall not 
remain in that custody more than 60 days before 
being heard by the designated classification 
committee. This conunittee may choose to continue 
the crassification assigned by· the disciplinary 
committee or may change classification to any 
le~el deemed appropriate and consistent with 
classification procedures. Reductions to maximum 
shall" be reviewed within 30 daY.s. All other 
reductions shall be reviewed with 60 days. The 
inmate may be moved to a new housing area 
·consistent with the major disciplinary committee 
decision. 
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APPENDIX ~ 
2. The classification assigned as a disposition of the 
disciplinary committee shall become effective at 
the time of the committee's decision. The final 
decision i~ subject to review by the classification 
review conuni ttee. This review shall be made within 
.15 days or at the next t·egularly scheduled meeting. 1 
This committee may exercise either of two options: 
a. Accept the disciplinary committee's 
reconunendation. 
b. Reject the committee's decision and 
substitute another custody. Under no 
circumstances shnll this substitute cu~tody 
be more restrictive than that imposed by 
the disciplinary committee. 
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